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Problem Description
Testing, unlike debugging, should give us conﬁdence that the system is working
properly. Usually testing focuses on what the system should do, and forgets that
there are events that should not occur due to safety requirements.
Safety analysis methods give us measures to prevent, limit and reduce
consequences. This thesis should look at which test methods and test
environments that ﬁt testing the diﬀerent safety mechanisms best. These
mechanisms are deﬁned from safety analysis output.
How can the barrier model  prevent, control, reduce consequences - be used to
deﬁne the test cases for a safety system?
Assignment given:
Supervisor:
17. January 2011
Tor Stålhane

Abstract
As software systems increasingly are used to control critical infrastructure, trans-
portation systems and factory equipment, the use of proper testing methods have
become more important. Systems that can cause harm to people, equipment or the
environment they operate in are called safety critical systems.
The suppliers of safety critical systems make use of safety analysis methods to inves-
tigate possible hazards. The output from the analysis is possible causes and eﬀects
of the hazards found. These results are a large part of the basis for writing safety
requirements for the system.
The safety requirements should be tested thoroughly to avoid accidents. It is im-
portant that the right testing technique is applied to test these systems. The con-
sequences of a system failure can be high, and it is thus crucial to make use of a
testing technique that has an approach that ﬁts safety testing.
Barrier models and safety analysis results are often used to help writing test cases
for safety critical systems. This thesis will present an experiment that study several
testing techniques, and how they can use the information given by safety analysis
results and the barrier model to write test cases.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This chapter provides report outline and project context.
1
1.1 Report outline
This report consist of four parts. First we present the the Preliminary Study.
This part is meant as preparation for the experiment that shall be done. As well
as presenting the needed theory, this part shall decide which safety analysis method
and testing techniques to use in the experiment. The second part presents the Ex-
periment Planning and Operation. This part starts out with presenting the
two research questions. The main chapter presents the available documentation for
the steam boiler system, that shall be used in the experiment. Afterwards the ex-
periment participants and groups are presented, as well as the available information
for each group. The experiment execution is also presented. The last chapter guides
the reader through the assessment of the deliveries, that was done in several stages.
The third part presents Results and Discussion. In addition, it states possible
sources of fault. The fourth and last part contains Conclusions and Further
Work.
1.2 Project context
The work is done in cooperation with the CESAR project at IDI, NTNU. The safety
system presented in the experiment is documentation of a steam boiler safety system
provided by ABB.
2
Part I
Preliminary Study
3
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CHAPTER 2
Safety analysis methods
This chapter will present safety analysis methods and decide which one that suits
the experiment best.
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2.1 Introduction
Safety analysis methods are used to ﬁnd and prioritize hazards for a given safety
critical system. There are a wide variety of methods available. The most used
methods are listed in the next section.
2.2 Safety analysis methods
The most used safety analysis methods are listed below. They are discussed further
in [4]. These methods are compared to decide which one ﬁts the experiment best.
See table 2.1.
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
• Failure Mode Eﬀect Analysis (FMEA)
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
• Hazard and Operability studies (HazOp)
2.2.1 Comparison of safety analysis methods
The methods listed above use diﬀerent approaches to ﬁnd the hazards, causes and
eﬀects. They are also used in diﬀerent development phases. This thesis looks at how
use of safety analysis results is useful for writing test cases for a safety system. The
system which is used in the upcoming experiment is a steam boiler which only exists
in a concept phase. Because of this, the upcoming experiment regarding test case
writing should make use of a safety analysis method that ﬁts best for the concept
phase of development. Since the experiment participants have limited time to solve
the task, it is important that the analysis results are easy to understand.
Safety analysis method Project phase General/Specific Top-down/Bottom-up Understanding the output
PHA Early General None Easy
FMEA Middle Both Top-down Difficult
FTA Middle Specific Bottom-up Difficult
HazOp Early General None Easy
Table 2.1: Comparison of safety analysis methods
The comparison above is based on statements taken from [5]. Given the com-
parison above, PHA ﬁts best for the experiment. PHA is suitable for early project
phases. The article found in [6] discusses the use of PHA for prototype analysis,
and states: "Sometimes even a simple picture or diagram can help show potential
hazardous situations".
PHA's general approach to ﬁnding hazards gives us a result that is only limited by
the knowledge of the group performing the PHA. PHA results are presented in a ta-
ble that is easy to understand without any previous knowledge of the method. Since
most of our experiment participants do not have any prior experience with safety
analysis results, it is crucial for the experiment that the results are understandable
in a short matter of time. PHA will be explained in detail in the next section.
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2.3 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
The preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) technique is a safety analysis tool for iden-
tifying hazards, their associated causal factors, eﬀects, level of risk, and mitigation
design measures when detailed design information is not available. [7] For every
hazard there should be deﬁned preventive actions to prevent accidents from occur-
ing. PHA is typically performed in the early project phases. PHA is performed by
a team, which should have diﬀerent backgrounds. There should be domain experts,
future users, safety experts and software/hardware experts. Diversity in expertise
is needed to be sure that as many hazards as possible are found. Diﬀerent people
will have diﬀerent viewpoints, and typically ﬁnd diﬀerent kinds of hazards. Every
hazard found should be connected to a set of causes and eﬀects. There can be one
or more of both. Deﬁning the causes and eﬀects are important, both to decide the
severeness of an accident, and to deﬁne preventive actions. PHA can also be com-
bined with fault tree analysis. FTA, with its bottom-up manner, investigates a tree
of linked causes that leads to accidents. By combining PHA and FTA, the team can
look at the hazards from diﬀerent angles. This yields more insight into the hazards,
and will help in developing the safety system as good as can be.
2.3.1 PHA results
The result from a PHA is a table with one row or more per hazard. The table
should, as a minimum, consist of the following columns:
• Hazard
The name of the hazard.
• Causes
The cause(s) for this hazard.
• Eﬀects
The eﬀect(s) of this hazard.
• Preventive actions
Preventive actions against the hazard.
It is important to detect every possible cause and eﬀect for each hazard. To
deﬁne preventive actions, every cause needs to be covered. If we forget to identify
and handle one cause, it may result in accidents because of safety system failure.
In the example provided in table 2.2, we have added a column that describes which
barrier the respective preventive action is realized in.
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2.3.2 PHA - An example
This example is from ABB. The table showed in 2.2, is the result of a PHA performed
on a steam boiler that operates on a factory site.
Hazard Cause Main effect Preventive action Realization   
Too high 
pressure in 
the tank 
  
  
Not able to turn off the 
heating (sensor, control, 
actuator, connections) 
  
Boiler explodes 
  
Safety valve 
Original 
requirement  
Turn off the heat 
Detect and 
control 
Feeding pump failure (too 
strong) 
Boiler rupture 
Turn off power to the 
feeding pump 
Detect and 
control 
Too high 
water level 
Water level regulation 
failure (sensor, control, 
actuator, connections) 
Water to the 
process 
Pump emergency stop 
Detect and 
control 
Too high 
pressure in 
the feed pipe 
  
Non-return valve failure 
  
Release boiling 
water to the 
water supply 
  
Two non-return valves 
in series 
- 
Emergency valve for 
releasing pressure 
Original 
requirements 
The tank is too 
hot 
  
Too little water and too 
much heat (sensor, 
control, actuator, 
connections) 
  
Tank gets hot/fire 
  
Turn off the heat 
Detect and 
stop 
Add water? - 
Unintentional 
leaks 
  
Corrosion 
People get 
scalded 
Inspection, collector 
tray or quality 
assurance 
- 
Bad welding/fittings 
People get 
scalded 
Inspection, collector 
tray or quality 
assurance 
- 
Electric shock Short circuit 
People get 
hurt/killed 
Fuses - 
Flooding Breakage in pipes 
Damage to 
equipment 
and/or 
environment 
Flow meter, collector 
tray 
- 
 
 Table 2.2: Result from PHA performed on ABB's steam boiler [3]
As we can see from this table, each hazard can have multiple rows for causes,
eﬀects and preventive actions. The rightmost column names the realization of the
preventive action, which is the barrier that implements the preventive action. The
use of barriers are explained in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Barrier model
This chapter presents the barrier model, and how it is applied to prevent acci-
dents in safety critical systems.
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3.1 Introduction
The barrier model refers to the safety mechanisms implemented to avoid dangerous
behaviour in safety critical systems.
3.2 Anatomy of an accident
We can often see that an accident happens after a series of events occuring in software
or hardware. Green's anatomy of an accident, showed in ﬁgure 3.1, explains how a
system escalates from normal operation to an accident through a series of events.
Figure 3.1: Green's anatomy of an accident [1]
It is important to understand that an accident often occurs after multiple barriers
have failed to work as intended. These barriers are safety measures implemented in
the system. The barriers should form a defence against accidents occuring, and are
implemented in diﬀerent levels.
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3.3 The barrier model
The barrier model presents several levels of barriers to minimize or remove the
consequences of faulty events in a safety critical system.
• Failure prevention
Prevent a hazard from leading to a problem
• Failure control
Prevent a problem from causing a dangerous event
• Failure recovery/reduction
Reduce the eﬀect of a dangerous event if it can not be prevented
These three types of safety measures can be seen in ﬁgure 3.1. A barrier is
an obstacle, an obstruction, or a hindrance that may either prevent an action from
being carried out or an event from taking place, or thwart or lessen the impact of the
consequences. [8] Failure prevention should keep the system in normal condition.
Unexpected events should be avoided, by monitoring the system adequately. If
this fails to work, an unexpected event might occur. The system then reaches an
abnormal condition. This is where failure control comes into the picture. Control
measures should be implemented to avoid failure of the system. The system should
be able to detect the abnormal condition, analyze it and perform action on actuators
so that the system can be put back into normal operation. If the control measures
fail to work, we have loss of control over the system. We now have a situation
where we are close to an accident. This is where failure reduction should be put into
action. The system should understand that the failure control system has failed,
and perform actions that put the system to a stop. This can be done by cutting the
power or other drastic measures. This is a last way out, and if no action is executed
at this stage an accident is close. This is shown in ﬁgure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Barriers against accidents
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It is crucial that these levels of safety measures cooperate to avoid accidents. The
barriers should be implemented so that multiple barriers are working against every
possible hazard found in the safety analysis. Operating procedures for handling
crises should be deﬁned with regards to the barriers implemented in the system. [9]
3.3.1 Failure prevention
Failure prevention is the ﬁrst barrier to avoid accidents. Prevention mechanisms
are implemented in the system, to prevent faulty events from occuring at all. An
example of a failure prevention mechanism is a safety valve in a steam boiler, that
should open if the pressure exceeds a set limit.
3.3.2 Failure control
Failure control is the next barrier. When a faulty state has occured, it is important
to detect and control this as soon as possible to put recovery measures to eﬀect.
Detection measures for hardware can for example be a heartbeat given from one of
the hardware units. This heartbeat is checked for arrival at a given time interval.
When the heartbeat is not received within this interval, we can assume that the
hardware unit has failed. It is now crucial to recover from this faulty event before
it escalates towards an accident.
3.3.3 Failure recovery
Failure recovery is used to recover the system from a faulty state. For every faulty
event found in safety analysis, there should be a possibility to recover control over
the system before accidents occur. One simple example of a recovery measure is to
have an emergency unit that can shut down the system.
3.4 Barriers - an example
This section will provide an example of how we can write safety requirements from a
hazard analysis. The example is taken from [4], and deals with safety in Air Traﬃc
Management (ATM). The ATM system uses diﬀerent barriers to prevent accidents
from happening. To simplify, we only consider the hazard of a possible mid-air
collision (MAC) between two aircrafts. For this hazard we should have diﬀerent
safety measures for diﬀerent levels, as we have described in the previous section.
An accident can only occur if all these measures fail to work as intended. The
consequence of this hazard occuring is obviously high.
3.4.1 MAC prevention measures
• Airspace design:
Structuring the airspace so as to keep aircrafts apart spacially, in the lateral
and/or vertical dimensions
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• Conﬂict avoidance:
Planning the routing and timing of individual ﬂigths so that the aircraft, if
they follow their planned trajectories, would not pass each other within the
prescribed minimum separation
3.4.2 MAC detection/recovery measures
• Conﬂict resolution:
Detecting conﬂicts when they do occur and resolving the situation by changing
the heading, altitude or speed of the aircraft appropriately
3.4.3 Description of the mechanisms
As shown in ﬁgure 3.1, we have diﬀerent types of mechanisms. Both prevention and
detection/recovery mechanisms are implemented in the system to provide diﬀerent
levels of protection against accidents. The measures listed are separated into two
diﬀerent services. A Separation Provision service controls the ﬂow of traﬃc within
the declared capacity. Collision Avoidance is intended to recover the situation
only for those potential accidents that Separation Provision has not removed from
the system. The mechanisms diﬀer in how they are controlled; either by human,
machine or a combination of the two.
• Air Traﬃc Control recovery mechanisms - human and/or machine-based
safety nets
• Pilot recovery mechanism - again, human and/or machine-based safety nets
• Providence - i.e pure chance
The barriers mentioned are not 100% eﬀective even when working to speciﬁca-
tion. This means that we are always dealing with some minimized risk, but this
level must be tolerable. Often these levels are set by laws regarding air traﬃc, and
can therefore vary according to the country where the system is deployed. [10]
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CHAPTER 4
Test environments
This chapter presents test environments used for testing safety critical systems.
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4.1 Introduction
Several test environments are used for testing software systems. Safety critical
systems often require simulated environments so that we can test the system in a
safe manner. This chapter will present a discussion on how safety critical systems
can be tested both in simulated and real environments.
4.2 Interface speciﬁcation
The system under test should use the same interface towards the test environment,
regardless of whether it is a simulated or real environment. Figure 4.1 shows how
the system should be connected to the environments.
Figure 4.1: Interface against test environments [2]
As we see, the environments are treated as equal environments. This is important
to achieve valid test results from the environment simulation testing.
4.3 Environment simulator testing
Many safety critical systems can not be tested in full operation before late devel-
opment stages, because of the possibility of an accident. In these cases, the system
needs to be run in an artiﬁcal environment, where the agents and sensors are sim-
ulated. It is important that the artiﬁcal environment represents the real life envi-
ronment, so that the test results are valid. When performing testing in a simulated
environment, there should be a clear and consise interface deﬁniton available. All
contact points with the environment surrounding the system when put into opera-
tion must be correct, so that the system perceives the test environment as the real
life environment. The simulated environment is connected to the system in the same
way as the real environment should be connected.
Other factors that decide if simulated test environments should be used are cost and
development stage. Some safety critical systems rely on cooperation with expensive
hardware or software that might not be available at an early stage of testing. If
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this hardware or software can be simulated, money can be saved for later stages
of testing. Also, if the project is in an early stage, there might be only high level
design available. Testing in a simulated environment can conﬁrm if the design suits
the requirements. In this way early versions of the systems can be tested without
large expenses for hardware. The design can be validated or rejected based on these
tests. This is a cheap way of testing diﬀerent system designs whitout the need of
sensors, actuators and other hardware.
4.4 Real environment testing
As the project goes on and more system characteristics are well deﬁned, full op-
eration testing can be done. The real environment should be connected with the
same interface that the simulated environment was, as shown in ﬁgure 4.1. In this
way, we have test documentation about the systems characteristics before the oper-
ational testing begins. The operational testing can be done on site or in an similar
environment if this is available.
Testing on site is often done for acceptance testing. It is important for the company
responsible for development, testing, or both, that this testing gives the buyer or
potential buyer conﬁdence in the system. If environment simulator testing is lacking,
or badly done, there is a big risk for the system to fail, at least partly, on site. This
does not give a lot of conﬁdence, neither in the system, or the responsible company.
4.5 Comparison of test environments
A comparison of the two diﬀerent test environments is provided below.
Criteria Environment 
simulation
Real environment
Project phase Earlier stages Later stages
Cost Cheaper More expensive
Validity Less More
Table 4.1: Comparison of test environments
As the earlier descriptions of the environments suggest, a combination of these
would be the best in most situations. Environment simulation gives the possibility
to try out early system designs without high costs. In addition it prepares the
system to be tested for full operation on site. Operation testing is often done on
delivery as a part of acceptance testing for the buying company.
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CHAPTER 5
Test methods
This chapter presents test methods used for testing safety critical systems.
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5.1 Introduction
A number of test methods can be used for testing safety critical systems. This
chapter presents two test cathegories for such systems, and the most important test
methods that belong in these categories.
5.2 Speciﬁc and general approaches to testing
When testing, one of the approaches is to test speciﬁcally on known hazards. When
testing in this manner, we want to see how the system handles hazardous events.
There should be barriers implemented against these faults, often in the three cate-
gories prevention, detection and recovery. The strength of this approach is that we
test every known hazard systematically, and end up with a system that can handle
all known faults. The weakness is in ﬁnding new faults. When testing a speciﬁc
system state, it is diﬃcult to reveal potential threats that are not yet found.
A general approach is strong where the speciﬁc approach is weak, and the other
way around. If we use a very speciﬁc approach, we have little chance of ﬁnding new
faults. This is where the general approach is strong. This approach has a much
better chance of ﬁnding new, unknown faults. As [4] suggests, it may be better
to use both approaches to both cover the known faults and ﬁnd new ones. If we
use the approaches in an iterative manner, we have a good chance at testing the
system thoroughly. Testing can stop when we have tested all known faults, and no
new faults are found during testing. We must also be sure that we have a high test
coverage of the system, whether it is code or path coverage. The limit for suﬃcient
coverage depends on the nature of the system, and should be set prior to testing.
The limit may be increased while testing is performed, if we feel that the limit is set
too low. It is not recommended to lower the limit, since this often may be a result
of too little time to perform testing. It would be better to just delay the delivery
date, to assure that the system is tested thoroughly.
5.3 Fault injection
In the last decade, fault injection has become a popular technique for experimentally
determining the dependability parameters of a system, such as detection latency or
fault coverage. [11] It provides the means for studying interactions between faults,
errors, failures and fault-handling mechanisms. [12] Fault injection got a high score
in the comparison done in [4], and due to the technique's approach towards testing
faults it will be used in the experiment. Fault injection is best at testing the known
faults. Fault injection is not good at ﬁnding new faults, and should therefore be
used together with a more general test method to be able to ﬁnd unknown faults.
Fault injection tests the handling of known faults systematically. For each known
fault, the testers should inject the fault into the system, either on an agent/sensor,
or in the code, depending on the type of fault. They should then monitor the
system, and keep track of what safety measures that are set into action to stop this
hazardous state from developing into an accident. Testing is ﬁnished when the faults
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known prior to testing are covered, and other additional safety measures needed is
implemented and tested.
5.3.1 Hardware fault injection
Hardware fault injection is one way of performing fault injection testing. It is per-
formed by manipulating the system hardware, either with or without direct hardware
contact.
• Hardware fault injection with contact
Hardware fault injection with contact can be done by damaging the hardware
directly, for example by cutting an electrical circuit or damaging a hardware
component.
• Hardware fault injection without contact
Hardware fault injection without contact can for example be done by using
electrical induction to create noise or faults in the system hardware. When we
do not have direct contact, it may be diﬃcult to test speciﬁc faults, but one
bonus is that other faults can be found by coincidence. [13]
5.3.2 Software fault injection
Software fault injection manipulates software to achieve hazardous states in the
system under test. The fault is inserted either before or after the system is put into
operation. Prior to operation the fault can be inserted into both uncompiled and
compiled code. When the system is put into operation, the testers should monitor
if the fault actually is executed, and how the system uses safety measures to handle
the fault and put the system back into a normal state. [13]
5.3.3 Fault injection test case
Table 5.1 shows an example test case using the fault injection technique.
 
Test case number 0 
Name Speed too high 
Pre-condition The speed sensor reads a too high value 
Pass criteria 
(how should the system react to this?) 
1. Decrease speed so that 
2. The current speed is below or equal 
to the set speed 
 
Textual description 
 
Testing is done by manipulating the speed 
sensor so that it reads a too high speed. The 
system should react by decreasing the speed 
so it is under or equal to the set speed. 
 
 
Table 5.1: Example fault injection test case
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5.4 Boundary value analysis/Equivalence partition-
ing
BVA/Equivalence partitioning is chosen as the second testing technique to be used
in the experiment. This technique got the second highest score in the comparison
done in [4], only beaten by fault injection. Boundary value testing is best ﬁtted for
testing where we have a limit value set in the requirements. When testing in this
manner, we want to execute loops below, right at and right above their boundary
conditions.
If a requirement contains a value, this is the value that represents the end of one
partition and the start of another partition. The highest value below the boundary
is a maximum value, while the lowest number above the boundary is a minimum
value. They are both boundary values. Testing should be done so that the values
fall on one side or the other, and see if the predicted system response is generated.
Safety critical systems often operate with boundary values, so the nature of this
technique makes it well suited for testing safety critical software. [4] Typical values
used to test the extremities, according to [14]:
• Min (Minimal)
• Min+ (Just above minimal)
• Nom (Average)
• Max- (Just below maximum)
• Max (Maximum)
In this way every possibility is checked, without having to check every possible
value within the partitions. When the participants in the experiment shall write
their test cases, it is expected that only the actual boundary is checked and not all
of the typical values listed above. This is due to the participant lack of experience
with this testing technique.
5.4.1 Boundary value analysis test case
Table 5.2 shows an example test case using boundary value analysis.
 Test case number 0 
Name Speed too high 
Pre-condition current_speed>set_speed 
Pass criteria 
(how should the system react to this?) 
1. Decrease speed so that 
2. current_speed<=set_speed 
 
 
Textual description 
 
If the current speed is over the set speed, the 
system should decrease speed until the 
current speed is under the set speed 
 
 
Table 5.2: Example boundary value analysis test case
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Part II
Experiment Planning and Operation
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CHAPTER 6
Experiment introduction
This chapter gives an introduction to the steam boiler experiment. It will also
state the research questions for this experiment.
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6.1 Introduction
The experiment investigates the process of writing test cases for safety critical sys-
tems. The experiment also investigates how the use of barriers in the software and
the use of results from safety analysis of the system helps in writing test cases. In
addition it compares two methods for testing the system, namely fault injection and
equivalence partitioning/boundary value analysis.
6.2 Experiment goal
This experiment has two research questions:
• RQ 1: Which of the two test methods fault injection and equivalence parti-
tioning/boundary value analysis is best suited for writing test cases for safety
critical systems?
• RQ 2: Is the use of safety analysis results and barrier description helpful when
writing test cases for a safety critical system?
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CHAPTER 7
Steam boiler system
This chapter presents the steam boiler safety system which will be used in the
experiment.
27
7.1 Introduction
The system used for this experiment is a steam boiler used as a pilot for ABB in the
CESAR project. The steam boiler design exists in two diﬀerent versions, before and
after safety barriers are implemented. Functional and safety requirements, textual
use cases, PHA results and implemented barriers are also available.
7.2 Requirements
The system has two sets of requirements; functional requirements and safety re-
quirements. [3]
7.2.1 Functional requirements
FR1: The steam boiler shall be able to deliver steam to an industrial process.
FR2: The steam boiler shall be able to produce steam using electrical heating
element.
FR3: The steam boiler shall be able to control steam pressure using thermostat of
electrical heating element.
FR4: The steam boiler shall be able to control water level using feeding pump.
FR5: The feeding pump shall be able to deliver water using non-return valve.
FR6: If steam pressure greater than critical pressure level then the steam boiler
shall open safety valve.
7.2.2 Safety requirements
SR1: If the water level is greater than max water level, the safety system shall stop
the feeding pump.
SR2: If the steam pressure is greater than the max pressure level, the safety system
shall stop the feeding pump.
SR3: If the external temperature is greater than the max external temperature, the
safety system shall cut power to the heating element.
SR4: The user shall be able to inspect the steam boiler at a minimum rate of TBD
times per year.
SR5: If the water ﬂow is greater than the max water ﬂow, the safety system shall
stop the feeding pump.
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7.3 Textual use cases
There are four textual use cases for the system.
 Use Case Name Drum temperature control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Drum temperature is below limit or power to heater has been 
disconnected and alarm has been set 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds  
Read outside drum-temperature sensor T_outside 
Is T_outside>T_outside-limit? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Contactor) 
                   set “Too high temperature” alarm 
End use case 
Figure 7.1: TUC1: Drum temperature control
 
Use Case Name Water level control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Water level too high 
Trigger Water level sensor triggered  
Is water level sensor triggered? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Too high water level” alarm 
End use case  
Figure 7.2: TUC2: Water level control
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 Use Case Name Pressure control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Pressure too high 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds 
Read inside pressure sensor P 
Is P>P-limit? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Too high pressure” alarm 
End use case  
Figure 7.3: TUC3: Pressure control
 
Use Case Name Water flow control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Water flow failure 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds 
Read flow meter FM 
Is FM>FM-max? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Water flow failure” alarm 
End use case  
Figure 7.4: TUC4: Water ﬂow control
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7.4 The original system
The original system design is a straight forward steam boiler design with safety
measures implemented.
 
Figure 7.5: Steam boiler design [3]
The water pump, indicated by P, pumps water into the boiler. The heating
element heats the water inside the tank, and steam is produced. There are several
sensors which send signals to the control units.
• Sensor L: Is triggered when the water level exceeds a preset level
• Sensor P: Reads the pressure inside the tank
• Sensor T: Reads the temperature inside the tank
There are two control units which read this sensors, and execute actions according
to the values they receive. The control units control two actuators; the water pump
and the heating element. Also, there are two valves, one which delivers process
steam, and one that sends excess steam to the air.
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7.5 Results from safety analysis
The system has been the subject of a safety analysis. This safety analysis is con-
ducted as a Preliminary Hazard Analysis(PHA). The result from this analysis is
shown in table 7.1.
Hazard Cause Main effect Preventive action Realization   
Too high 
pressure in 
the tank 
  
  
Not able to turn off the 
heating (sensor, control, 
actuator, connections) 
  
Boiler explodes 
  
Safety valve 
Original 
requirement  
Turn off the heat 
Detect and 
control 
Feeding pump failure (too 
strong) 
Boiler rupture 
Turn off power to the 
feeding pump 
Detect and 
control 
Too high 
water level 
Water level regulation 
failure (sensor, control, 
actuator, connections) 
Water to the 
process 
Pump emergency stop 
Detect and 
control 
Too high 
pressure in 
the feed pipe 
  
Non-return valve failure 
  
Release boiling 
water to the 
water supply 
  
Two non-return valves 
in series 
- 
Emergency valve for 
releasing pressure 
Original 
requirements 
The tank is too 
hot 
  
Too little water and too 
much heat (sensor, 
control, actuator, 
connections) 
  
Tank gets hot/fire 
  
Turn off the heat 
Detect and 
stop 
Add water? - 
Unintentional 
leaks 
  
Corrosion 
People get 
scalded 
Inspection, collector 
tray or quality 
assurance 
- 
Bad welding/fittings 
People get 
scalded 
Inspection, collector 
tray or quality 
assurance 
- 
Electric shock Short circuit 
People get 
hurt/killed 
Fuses - 
Flooding Breakage in pipes 
Damage to 
equipment 
and/or 
environment 
Flow meter, collector 
tray 
- 
 
 
Table 7.1: Results from PHA [3]
The diﬀerent columns are described in the safety analysis chapter in the prelim-
inary study.
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7.6 Implemented barriers
The rightmost column in table 7.1 shows that there are two implemented safety
barriers.
1. Detect and control
2. Detect and stop
Figure 7.6 shows how they should work together to prevent accidents.
Control unit
Inside temperature sensor
Pressure sensor
Flow meter
Outside temperature sensor
Inspection
Manual restart
Detect and
control
Detect and
stop
Figure 7.6: Two implemented barriers
The ﬁrst barrier makes use of three sensors, and the second uses one. The
ﬁrst barrier is used for detecting and controlling faults in the system. It should be
able to put the system back into a normal state after detecting a fault. If the ﬁrst
barrier fails, the second barrier will cut the power by using the emergency shut-down
unit. This is a last measure to prevent accidents, and after this barrier is used, an
inspection and possible mending is needed before the system can be restarted. The
implementation of the two barriers are realized in the improved system.
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7.7 The improved system
Figure 7.7 shows the system after the safety barriers are implemented.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7: The improved system [3]
The improved system includes two safety units, which read the sensors and con-
trol the water pump and heating element accordingly. As explained in the previous
section, two main safety barriers are implemented in this version of the system.
These are named 'detect and control' and 'detect and stop'. The control systems
are realized through control units, which should control the actuators by reading the
diﬀerent sensors and interpreting these values. If the control system fails to work,
'detect and stop' should be put into action. This barrier's main job is to shut down
the system as a last safety measure. It is crucial that this barrier works as intended,
as it is the last measure to avoid accidents.
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CHAPTER 8
Experiment operation
This chapter presents the participants and groups, as well as the experiment
execution.
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8.1 Introduction
The participants are students at Industrial Economy studies at NTNU. They do
not have courses that cover the ﬁelds of safety critical systems, safety analysis or
testing. We assume that they do not have any experience with this kind of work at
all. They will be split into four groups. Each group get diﬀerent cases to solve. The
experiment duration is one hour.
8.2 Experiment groups
The participants in this experiment will be split into four groups.
 
GROUPS 
Test method 
Fault injection Equivalence 
partitioning/boundary 
value analysis 
Additional 
information 
None G1: 7 participants G3: 7 participants 
PHA results and barriers G2: 8 participants G4: 8 participants 
Table 8.1: Experiment groups
Two of the groups will use fault injection, while the other two will use equivalence
paritioning/boundary value analysis. The two groups using the same test method,
are split into two subgroups. Only one of the subgroups using fault injection will
use barriers and safety analysis results in their work. The same goes for the two
groups using BVA/equivalence partitioning.
8.3 System documentation available for the groups
Each group will be given some information about the system. Table 8.2 shows which
information is available to which group.
 
 
 G1 G2 G3 G4 
System design X  X  
System design with barriers  X  X 
Safety requirements X X X X 
Textual use cases X X X X 
PHA/barriers  X  X 
Fault injection task X X   
BVA task   X X 
Table 8.2: System documentation available for each group
We can see that the only diﬀerence is that two of the groups get to use PHA
results and barriers, and in addition the system design diagram shows how the
barriers are implemented. All groups are also provided with an example test case
to help in formatting their test cases properly. The four diﬀerent cases can be seen
in the appendices.
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8.4 Experiment execution
The experiment is performed over one hour. The participant's main task is to write
test cases for the steam boiler system. The one hour experiment is split into these
subtasks:
• The cases are handed out
• 5-10 minutes: Steam boiler safety system presentation on PowerPoint
• 10-15 minutes: Read and understand the steam boiler system
• Test case templates are handed out
• 35-45 minutes: Write test cases
The output from this experiment is the test cases written by the participants.
The test cases are assessed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 9
Assessment of the deliveries
This chapter presents the diﬀerent stages of assessment done to evaluate the
deliveries from the experiment participants.
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9.1 Introduction
The assessment of the deliveries was done over numerous stages by the author and
supervisor of this thesis. A reference set of test cases was used as help to decide if
a test case was valid or not.
9.2 Test cases covering the system
Given the system documentation, we have made a set of test cases that provide good
coverage of the system. The test cases are written with regard to the set of safety
requirements together with the system design documents. The listed test cases will
form a basis for giving scores to the experiment participants answers.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
, MAX_WF=max water flow, WL=water level, MAX_WL=max water level, 
 INT_TEMP=internal temperature, MAX_INT_TEMP=max internal temperature, EX_TEMP=external temperature, 
 MAX_EX_TEMP=max external temperature, P=pressure, MAX_P=max pressure, CRIT_P=critical pressure 
 
 
# NAME PRECONDITION PREVENTIVE ACTION REFERENCE 
01 Water flow WF>MAX_WF Stop feeding pump SR4, TUC4 
02 Water level WL>MAX_WL Stop feeding pump SR1, TUC2 
03 Internal temperature INT_TEMP>MAX_INT_TEMP Stop heating element FIGURE 
04 External temperature EX_TEMP>MAX_EX_TEMP Cut power heating el. SR3, TUC1 
05 Steam pressure_max1 P>MAX_P Stop feeding pump SR2, TUC3 
06 Steam pressure_max2 P>MAX_P Stop heating element FIGURE 
07 Steam pressure_crit P>CRIT_P Open safety valve SR5 
08 Return valves P>MAX_P Release pressure PHA 
09 Leakage Unintentional leaks Inspection, QA, c. tray PHA 
10 Short circuit Damage on electrical comp. Usage of fuses PHA 
11 Pipe breakage Pipe damage Flow meter, c. tray PHA 
Table 9.1: Test cases covering the system
Test case number 1 through 7 are based on the safety requirements, system
design sheets and use cases. Test case 8 through 11 are based on the safety analysis
results. As a result of this, the latter will be more visible for the two groups which
are provided with PHA results. Test cases 8 through 11 are therefore not critical to
the same extent as the ﬁrst 7. Note that test cases not provided in the reference set
can also be given points.
9.3 Criterias for setting the score
In advance we agreed on the criterias for giving points.
• Every test case should get a score of either 0, 0.5 or 1.
• To achieve a score of 1, the pre-condition and pass criteria must be spot on.
The textual description must describe how the testing should be done.
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9.4 Stage 1: Individual assessment
When the experiment was done, we had a set of test cases as output. Each of the
participants had made their own set of test cases, and every delivery was given an
ID. The ID is on the format <group no.>-<participant no.> We made a copy of
the deliveries so that both the author and the supervisor had identical sets. At ﬁrst
we assessed the test cases individually. This was done because it would give us a
basis for discussion about the assessment afterwards. When both had given scores
to every delivery, we sat down to ﬁnd deviations and discuss the assessment.
9.5 Stage 2: Comparing assessments
When the ﬁrst assessment was done, a meeting was held to compare the assessments.
We were prepared to ﬁnd deviations, since a factor of subjectiveness is present when
giving a score to a test case. We found that we had a lot of deviations. Fortunately,
almost all of the deviations stemmed from three main causes:
1. Multiple test cases from reference set represented in one test case.
2. Diﬀerent assessments of the quality of the textual description.
3. Test case 8 from table 9.1 is not directly connected to the control system.
After a discussion of these three causes, we added three more criterias to the
assessment.
• Some test cases include multiple test cases from the reference set of test cases.
They can be given a score over the maximum of 1.
• Test cases that are correct, but lack a good textual description are given a
score of 0.5.
• Test case 8 from the reference set in table 9.1 is given a score of maximum
0.5. The safety valve is not included in the control system, but is a mechanical
valve that controls ﬂow direction. Since the task given could be somewhat
diﬀuse regarding this matter, half a point is given.
9.6 Stage 3: Individual assessment
After setting these three new criterias, we assessed every delivery individually a
second time. We assumed that more compliance would be achieved when more
ground rules were set for giving points.
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9.7 Stage 4: Comparing assessments
After setting the scores individually, we met again to discuss the results. This
time we found more compliance for the groups using fault injection. After some
minor adjustments, we came to an agreement on every delivery from the two groups
using fault injection as their test method. There were still large diﬀerences in the
assessment of the groups using boundary testing. We quickly saw that the main
issue was the textual description, and that we had a diﬀerence in opinion regarding
how much description that was needed to get a full score. This problem boiled
down to a core question for the experiment. How much should be demanded from
the experiment participants? We understood that we needed to give this some
thought until we had reached a decision that justiﬁed both the participants and our
opinions.
After discussing this matter further, we decided that the diﬀerence between the
barriers, namely 'detect and control' and 'detect and stop' needed to be kept intact.
Mainly because this was part of one of the research questions, and therefore an
important part of the experiment. If we were to give a full score on test cases
that did not emphasize this fact, we would remove some of the diﬀerences between
the groups that got information about barriers and those who did not get this
information. Participants that understood this diﬀerence needed to be awarded for
this to keep the experiment results valid.
Also, there were some diﬀerences in opinion regarding how detailed the textual
description should be. We decided that test cases for the control system needed
a valid pre-condition and system reaction, combined with a textual description to
get a full score. The textual description had to describe how the system should be
monitored during testing. For 'detect and stop' testing, it should be mentioned that
the control system needs to be stopped before testing the second barrier. To sum
up, these groundrules for setting the score was added:
• The participants need to understand the diﬀerence between the implemented
barriers, where this is needed.
• The textual description needs to describe how the system should be monitored
during testing.
• For 'detect and stop' testing, the control system should be stopped before
testing can start. This needs to be mentioned to achieve a full score for the
test case.
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9.8 Final groundrules for assessment
After four assessment stages, we agreed on a set of common groundrules for giv-
ing out scores. Before the ﬁnal comparison of assessments, these groundrules were
summarized in a table. The groundrules are displayed in table 9.2.
 
Final groundrules for assessment 
Every test case can get a maximum of 1 point 
To achieve top score, the pre-condition and pass criteria must be spot on. The textual description 
must be good 
The textual description must describe how the testing should be done 
Test cases including multiple correct test cases from the reference set should get one individual 
score per reference test case 
Test cases including multiple correct test cases from the reference set can get more than the 
maximum score of 1 point 
Test cases that are correct but lack a good textual description should get 0.5 points 
Test case 8 from the reference set is given a maximum of 0.5 points. 
Test cases regarding the barrier 'detect and stop', needs to include that the control system must be 
stopped before testing to achieve the full score 
The textual description needs to describe how the system should be monitored during testing 
Test cases regarding the barrier 'detect and stop', needs to include that the control system must be 
stopped before testing to achieve the full score 
Table 9.2: Final groundrules for test case assessment
With these groundrules put down, we assessed the test cases individually for
ﬁnal adjustments once more. After that, the ﬁnal comparison is done to decide on
diﬀerences that are still there.
9.9 Stage 5: Final comparison of assessments
A ﬁnal meeting was held to ﬁnalize the assessment of the test cases. After setting
all of the previous mentioned groundrules we assumed that a lot of the diﬀerences
were removed. Our assumption was correct, and only smaller adjustments and
discussions were needed to decide on the ﬁnal scores for all participants. The larger
part of these adjustments were misunderstandings or misreadings of the test cases.
The ﬁnal scores for the participants are presented in the next part.
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Part III
Results and Discussion
45
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CHAPTER 10
Results
This chapter provides experiment results.
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10.1 Introduction
This chapter presents both individual and group results from the steam boiler ex-
periment.
10.2 Individual results
The experiment participants were split into four groups, as shown in table 8.1. Each
participant was given an ID that consisted of two numbers, the ﬁrst number denotes
the group ID and the second number is an individual ID to separate each delivery.
The scores for all participants are provided in table 10.1.
 
 
ID NUMBER OF CASES SCORE 
1-1 5 4.0 
1-2 6 5.0 
1-3 8 6.5 
1-4 12 10.0 
1-5 6 4.5 
1-6 10 5.5 
1-7 5 4.5 
2-1 7 6.0 
2-2 7 4.5 
2-3 7 6.5 
2-4 6 4.5 
2-5 8 6.0 
2-6 7 6.0 
2-7 7 6.5 
2-8 6 6.0 
3-1 13 7.5 
3-2 11 6.0 
3-3 9 6.0 
3-4 9 5.0 
3-5 8 5.0 
3-6 9 3.5 
3-7 3 2.5 
4-1 8 5.0 
4-2 6 4.5 
4-3 5 2.5 
4-4 5 4.5 
4-5 7 4.5 
4-6 4 2.0 
4-7 10 8.0 
4-8 7 4.5 
Table 10.1: Participant scores
This table shows the number of written test cases and the score given for each
participant. Quality assurance of these scores are secured through the assessment
stages described in the previous chapter. The next section provides analysis of these
data.
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10.3 Group results
This section provides data analysis of the experiment results. A brief discussion of
the most important test data are done after each test result table. The analysis
should provide a base for later discussion regarding the research questions provided
earlier. The software used for data analysis is Minitab and Microsoft Excel. Testing
is done by performing a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances.
10.3.1 Fault injection
1->2
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Without PHA/barriers With PHA/barriers
Mean 5,714 5,750
Variance 4,238 0,643
Observations 7 8
HMD 0
df 8
t Stat -0,043
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,483
t Critical one-tail 1,860
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,967
t Critical two-tail 2,306
Fault injection
Table 10.2: Fault injection t-test
The t-test is performed on group 1 and 2, fault injection with and without the
use of PHA results and barriers. The test shows that the mean score for these groups
are basically the same. The group with information about barriers and PHA results
has a slightly higher mean. The large p-value is a result of the high variance for
group 1. Since the p-value is large, the results are not useful for any discussion,
since the results most likely are random. A larger number of observations can be
used to get useful results.
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10.3.2 Boundary value analysis
3->4
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Without PHA/barriers With PHA/barriers
Mean 5,071 4,438
Variance 2,786 3,246
Observations 7 8
HMD 0
df 13
t Stat 0,707
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,246
t Critical one-tail 1,771
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,492
t Critical two-tail 2,160
Boundary value analysis
Table 10.3: Boundary value analysis t-test
The t-test is performed on group 3 and 4, boundary value analysis with and without
the use of PHA results and barriers. The test shows that the diﬀerence in mean
score for these groups is 0.63. The group that did not use PHA results and barriers
has the highest mean score. The variance for these groups are 2.79 and 3.25, which
is high. The p-value is 0.49, which is a result of the high variance for these groups.
Since the diﬀerence in mean is small and the p-value is high, the results can not be
used to conclude anything. The risk of random results are very likely. Since none
of the two ﬁrst tests give clear diﬀerences, a combination of groups should be tested
to increase the number of observations.
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10.3.3 PHA/barriers
1+3->2+4
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Without PHA/barriers With PHA/barriers
Mean 5,393 5,094
Variance 3,353 2,274
Observations 14 16
HMD 0
df 25
t Stat 0,484
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,316
t Critical one-tail 1,708
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,632
t Critical two-tail 2,060
Total
Table 10.4: Extra information t-test
This t-test is performed on group 1 and 3 combined, against group 2 and 4 combined.
Since we rejected the hypothesis for group 1 versus 2, and 3 versus 4, these data sets
are pooled together since they stem from the same population. The combination is
done to get a higher number of observations. Group 1 and 3 did not get to use PHA
results and barriers, while group 2 and 4 did. The groups that did not use PHA
results and barriers got the highest mean score, 0.30 higher than the groups with
this information. The number of observations are 14 and 16, but still the variance
is high. The p-value is 0.63 and the risk of random results are present. This test
does not give the expected results, but there are a number of variables that aﬀect
the results. These will be discussed later in this thesis, as sources of fault.
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10.3.4 Without PHA/barriers
1->3
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Fault injection Boundary value analysis
Mean 5,714 5,071
Variance 4,238 2,786
Observations 7 7
HMD 0
df 12
t Stat 0,642
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,267
t Critical one-tail 1,782
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,533
t Critical two-tail 2,179
Without information
Table 10.5: Without PHA/barriers t-test
This t-test is performed on group 1 and 3, the two groups without PHA results
and barriers. They use diﬀerent test methods, namely fault injection and boundary
value analysis. The diﬀerence in mean score for these groups are 0.64. Both groups
have a large variance. This variance gives us a high p-value, 0.53. This value tells
us that the risk for a random result is high. Although the p-value is rather high, the
diﬀerence in mean score gives us an indication that there might be valid diﬀerences
between the two test methods used in the experiment. To get a veriﬁcation of this,
the two groups using PHA results and barriers should be tested, to see if there also
exists a diﬀerence between the test methods when extra information is available.
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10.3.5 With PHA/barriers
2->4
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Fault injection Boundary value analysis
Mean 5,750 4,438
Variance 0,643 3,246
Observations 8 8
HMD 0
df 10
t Stat 1,883
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,045
t Critical one-tail 1,812
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,089
t Critical two-tail 2,228
With information
Table 10.6: With PHA/barriers t-test
This t-test is performed on group 2 and 4, the two groups using PHA results and
barriers. Again, the groups are using diﬀerent test methods, namely fault injection
and boundary value analysis. The diﬀerence in mean score is 1.31. This is a higher
diﬀerence than the previous test showed. This result veriﬁes that there is a diﬀerence
between the two test methods, as the previous test indicated. The variance for the
groups are 0.64 and 3.25. The p-value is 0.089. The low p-value indicates that there
is a low likelihood for random results. Since the two latter tests indicate a diﬀerence
for the two test methods, a test with the groups combined should be done to get a
higher number of observations.
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10.3.6 Test method
1+2->3+4
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Fault injection Boundary Value Analysis
Mean 5,733 4,733
Variance 2,138 2,924
Observations 15 15
HMD 0
df 27
t Stat 1,721
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,048
t Critical one-tail 1,703
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,097
t Critical two-tail 2,052
Total
Table 10.7: Test method t-test
This t-test is performed on group 1 and 2, against 3 and 4. Group 1 and 2 used
fault injection, while group 3 and 4 used boundary value analysis. The data sets
are pooled together since we accepted the hypothesis in one of the stand alone data
sets. The diﬀerence in mean score is exactly 1 point. The variance for the two test
methods are 2.14 and 2.92. The p-value is 0.097. This value tells us that there is
a low chance of random results. Given the larger number of observations, this test
is one of the more interesting. There is most likely a valid diﬀerence between using
fault injection and boundary value analysis. The diﬀerence is present both for the
groups using PHA results and barriers, and those who did not. Combined we get a
stronger data set, which clearly indicates that a diﬀerence is present. A discussion
of this result will be provided in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 11
Discussion
This chapter provides a discussion around the experiment results.
55
11.1 Introduction
This chapter will discuss the results presented in the previous chapter. The main
focus will lie on answering the two research questions provided earlier.
11.2 Research question 1
• RQ1: Which of the two test methods fault injection and equivalence
partitioning/boundary value analysis is best suited for writing test
cases for safety critical systems?
As we see from the results provided in table 10.7, fault injection scores better
than boundary value analysis. This result is valid both for the groups that
did not use PHA results and barriers, and those who did. The diﬀerences in
mean are 0.64 and 1.31, respectively. The diﬀerence in mean when the groups
are combined is exactly 1 point. One might think that 1 point is not much.
One reason that it actually makes a big diﬀerence, is that the test cases are
assessed in close combination with the reference set of test cases. The test
cases in the reference set, especially test cases 1 through 6, are critical for the
system safety and needs to be tested.
The mean scores for fault injection and boundary value analysis respectively,
are 5.73 and 4.73. Since each test case from the reference set is given 1 point
maximum, it is clear that a score equal to 6 covers the most critical points
of safety testing for this system. In other words, 6 points is what we should
expect that the participants were able to achieve. The groups using fault
injection are close to the expected score of 6 points, while the groups using
boundary value analysis lack slightly more than one important test case on
average. This could be the result of two things. Either they have overseen
one important aspect of the system, or they have written one or more test
cases lacking information. Given the nature of fault injection versus boundary
value analysis, it is valid to assume that fault injection yields a better basis
for writing safety tests. Fault injection has a natural coupling to safety system
testing, which often is based on testing how the system reacts to a fault.
When analyzing the test cases delivered from the boundary value analysis
groups, one thing that repeats itself is the lack of a good textual description
of the tests. They have diﬃculties in explaining how the testing should be
done in practice. The groups using fault injection seem to have a better un-
derstanding of this. Using fault injection to test the steam boiler, the main
procedure is to manipulate one or more sensors to provoke the safety system
to perform one or more actions on the actuators. The couplings between sen-
sors, control systems and actuators are fairly well described in the handouts,
through design ﬁgures combined with textual descriptions. In the deliveries,
participants using fault injection usually go straight to the point. Participants
using boundary value analysis are more vague when describing the diﬀerent
steps of testing.
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11.3 Research question 2
• RQ2: Is the use of safety analysis results and barriers helpful in
writing test cases for a safety critical system?
As we see from table 10.4, the participants that did not get the PHA re-
sults and barriers scored 0.30 points better on average than the participants
who did. The mean score for the participants that did not use PHA results and
barriers, is 5.39. The participants that used PHA results and barriers scored
5.09 points on average. As we can see from the t-test result, the p-value for
this test is 0.632. This value tells us that there is a high risk that the results
are a coincidence. If we only look at the groups using fault injection, the group
that had PHA results and barriers available scored slightly better than those
who did not, 0.04 on average. The p-value for the fault injection groups is
0.967. If we look at the same for boundary value analysis, the groups that did
not use PHA results and barriers scored 0.63 points better on average. Again,
the P-value is very high, 0.492.
Even though no conclusion can be made from these results due to the high
p-values, there can be made some assumptions. When the given time for the
experiment was about to run out, many of the participants were still writing
on their deliveries. The two groups that had PHA results and barrier infor-
mation in their case description had two more pages of information than the
groups that did not. Since the time span for this experiment was only one
hour in total, it is possible that the groups that had more information did not
have suﬃcient time to both understand the system and write all test cases.
The total experiment time of one hour was divided into three parts. During
the ﬁrst 5-10 minutes a short presentation of the system was given on Pow-
erPoint. The next 10-15 minutes the participants were supposed to get an
understanding of the system based on the handouts. The templates for writ-
ing test cases were deliberately not handed out before the participants had
read through the handouts. This was done to ensure that they actually tried
to understand the system before starting to write their test cases. The last
35-45 minutes were used to write test cases. The two groups that had the two
extra pages to read through in their handouts, might have used more than the
given 10-15 minutes to read and understand the system.
Given the assumptions above, it is clear that PHA results and barrier informa-
tion does not automatically yield better test case writing. Extra time needs
to be given to the test team, so they have suﬃcient time to read and under-
stand the information. The information might even be useless if no time is
earmarked for this speciﬁc task. It is important to note that this statement is
based on assumptions, and that no conclusion can be made.
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CHAPTER 12
Sources of fault
This chapter provides sources of fault for the experiment.
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12.1 Introduction
This chapter presents sources of faults for the experiment. The sources of fault are
divided into diﬀerent types.
12.2 Time
As discussed in the previous chapter, time could be one of the main sources of fault.
Most of the participants used all the time available, so if more time had been given
one might see diﬀerences in the results. If this assumption is correct, the results
that suﬀered most would be the testing done in connection to research question
2. Results regarding research question 1 are not aﬀected, since there are an equal
number of observations for participants with the extra two pages available.
12.3 Quality of case descriptions
The quality of the case descriptions for the four groups might be aberrant. Even
though the similarity of the case descriptions were emphasized when making them,
there might exist deviations that aﬀect the test results.
12.4 Participant knowledge/experience
All participants were students in the same class. We had no knowledge of their
experience or interest in the ﬁeld of knowledge relevant to this experiment. We have
made the assumption that these deviations are spread randomly over the groups,
so that the ﬁnal results still were valid. The case descriptions were handed out
randomly to avoid that participants with the same interests were put in the same
group. These measures help in randomizing the participants, but with a relatively
small number of observations one can never be sure.
Other possible sources of fault are mentioned below. Only the sources of fault
relevant for this experiment are chosen from a checklist. Some of the descriptions
are reported directly from [15], where the checklist is found.
12.5 Conclusion validity
12.5.1 Low statistical power
Some of the t-tests performed on this data give low statistical power. This is dis-
cussed for each t-test, so it should be clear which tests reveal a true pattern in the
data and which do not.
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12.5.2 Fishing and the error rate
Fishing for a speciﬁc result is a threat, and it can be done deliberately or not.
Since the experiment data is found by assessment of test cases, there is a risk of
undeliberately looking for the wanted answers. Several stages of assessment and
two people performing the assessment independently is done to increase the quality
of the assessments. The error rate is denoted mainly by the p-value for each test.
This value is emphasized when discussing the research questions.
12.5.3 Reliability of measures
Objective measures, that can be repeated with the same outcome, are more reliable
than subjective measures. For example there may be poor question wording in the
case descriptions.
12.5.4 Random heterogeneity of subjects
There is always heterogeneity in a study group. Since the participants are not
selected from a general enough population, this reduces the external validity of the
experiment.
12.6 Internal validity
12.6.1 Maturation
This is the eﬀect of the fact that the subjects react diﬀerently as time passes. Exam-
ples are when the subjects are aﬀected negatively (tired or bored) during the exper-
iment, or positively (learning) during the course of the experiment. This might be
a problem in this experiment, due to the diﬀerent participants that were involved.
12.6.2 Selection
This is the eﬀect of natural variation in human performance. Volunteers are generally
more motivated and suited for a new task than the whole population. Since every
participants were volunteers for this experiment, we have avoided this problem.
12.7 Construct validity
12.7.1 Hypothesis guessing
When people take part in an experiment they might try to ﬁgure out what the
purpose and intended result of the experiment is. Then they are likely to base their
behaviour on their guesses about the hypothesis, either positively of negatively,
depending on their attitude to the anticipated hypothesis. This source of fault
could have had an impact on this experiment.
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12.7.2 Evaluation apprehension
Some people are afraid of being evaluated. It is a tendency among people to try
to look better when being evaluated, which is confounded to the outcome of the
experiment. Since our participants are used to being evaluated on a regular basis,
this problem should be avoided in this experiment.
12.8 External validity
12.8.1 Interaction of selection and treatment
This is an eﬀect of having a subject population, not representative of the population
we want to generalize to. Since we used participants with no known experience, the
results may be diﬀerent than if we used participants that do this as their job on
a daily basis. Nevertheless, the group diﬀerences should be valid because we used
participants with the same academic background.
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Part IV
Conclusions
63
64
CHAPTER 13
Conclusions and further work
This chapter provides conclusions made from this master thesis. It also suggests
further work.
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13.1 Conclusions
This section provides conclusions from the experiments, separated for test method
and extra information.
13.1.1 Testing technique
As the experiment results suggest, we see a diﬀerence in the use of fault injection and
boundary value analysis when writing test cases for safety critical systems. Fault
injection scored better, both for groups using the extra information and those who
did not. The average diﬀerence for these two testing techniques is close to 1 point.
This point represents one important test case from the reference set of test cases for
the steam boiler. It is valid to assume that fault injection yields a better basis for
writing safety tests. Fault injection has a natural coupling to safety system testing,
which often is based on testing how the system reacts to an injected fault. Test
cases written for fault injection testing were less vaguely written than the boundary
value analysis tests.
13.1.2 Barrier model and safety analysis results
The data material from the experiment did not give any statistically valid results for
the use of extra information. The extra information did not help the participants
in writing test cases for the steam boiler. As sources of fault suggest, one problem
might be that participants using the extra information did not have enough time to
use this information. Given the results from the experiment, extra information does
not automatically give any better system coverage or test case quality. The only
conclusion to draw from this is that extra information requires extra time, both to
understand and make use of it. If not, the information might be useless.
13.2 Further work
To investigate the use of barrier models and safety analysis results more closely,
we should run a new experiment. In this experiment, the participants with extra
information need to get extra time to understand and make use of this information.
In this way, we may get valid results that show that this information makes a
diﬀerence. If possible, there should also be a larger number of observations.
66
67
68
References
[1] A. Bjørgan, Test methods for safety critical systems, 2010.
[2] A. C. Tribble and S. P. Miller, Software intensive systems safety analysis,
IEEE A&E SYSTEMS MAGAZINE, 2004.
[3] L. D. Gowen, J. S. Collofello, and F. W. Caliss, Preliminary hazards analysis
for safety-critical software systems, Computers and Communications, 1992.
Conference Proceedings, Eleventh Annual International Phoenix Conference,
1992.
[4] C. A. Ericson, Hazard analysis techniques for system safety. John Wiley &
Sons, INC., 2005.
[5] ABB, Steam boiler documentation,
[6] E. Hollnagel and C. Cacciabue, Reliability assessment of interactive systems
with the system response generator. safety and reliability '92, ESREL, London,
Elsevier Applied Science., 1992.
[7] E. Hollnagel, Accident analysis and barrier functions, TRAIN - Traﬃc Safety
and Information Environment for Train Drivers, 1999.
[8] T. Stålhane, Development of safety critical software, Lecture notes, TDT68,
Analyse av trygghet i IT-systemer, 2010.
[9] C. Sandom and D. Fowler, People and systems: Striking a safe balance be-
tween human and machine, Developments in Risk-based Approaches to Safety,
Proceedings of the 14th Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Springer-Verlag.,
2006.
[10] H. Tu and F. Wu, How to design an environment simulator for safety critical
software testing, Eigth Asian Test Symposium (ATS'99), 1999.
[11] J. Güthoﬀ and V. Sieh, Combining software-implemented and simulation-based
fault injection into a single fault injection method, Fault-Tolerant Comput-
ing, 1995. FTCS-25. Digest of Papers., Twenty-Fifth International Symposium,
1995.
[12] J. Christmansson, M. Hiller, and M. Rimèn, An experimental comparison of
fault and error injection, Software Reliability Engineering, 1998. Proceedings.
The Ninth International Symposium, 1998.
[13] M.-C. Hsueh, T. K. Tsai, and R. K. Iyer, Fault injection techniques and tools,
US Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1997.
69
[14] B. Neate, Boundary value analysis, University of Wales Swansea.
[15] C. Wohlin, P. Runeson, M. Höst, M. C. Ohlsson, B. Regnell, and A. Wesslen,
Experimentation in software engineering. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.
70
Appendices
71
72
APPENDIX A
Case 1
A-1
1 
 
CASE 1 
Introduction 
 
The system under test is a control system for a steam boiler. The following documentation 
is handed out: 
 
- Steam boiler with safety control units 
- Safety requirements 
- Textual use cases 
Task 1: Get an understanding of the system (15-20 min) 
 
Steam boiler with safety control units  
 
 
 
 
 
The water pump, denoted by P, pumps water into the boiler. The heating element heats the 
water inside the tank, and steam is produced. There are several sensors which send signals 
to the control units.  
 
 
Sensor L: Gives a signal if the water is above this level 
Sensor P: Reads the pressure inside the tank 
Sensor T: Reads the temperature inside/outside the tank (you can name them T_inside and 
T_outside when writing test cases) 
1 
 
 
There are two control units which use these sensors, and execute actions according to the 
values they receive. The control units control two actuators; the water pump and the heat 
element. Also, there are two valves, one which delivers process steam, and one that sends 
excess steam into the air. It is possible to shut down power to the heating element. 
 
 
 
 
Safety requirements 
 
1. If water level greater than max water level then the safety system shall  stop feeding 
pump 
2. If steam pressure greater than max pressure level then the safety system shall  stop 
feeding pump 
3. If external temperature greater than max external temperature then the safety system 
shall cut power heating element 
4. If water flow greater than max water flow then the safety system shall stop feeding 
pump 
5. If steam pressure greater than critical pressure level then the steam boiler shall open 
safety valve  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Textual use cases 
 
Use Case Name Drum temperature control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Drum temperature is below limit or power to heater has been 
disconnected and alarm has been set 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds  
Read outside drum-temperature sensor T_outside 
Is T_outside > T_outside-limit? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Contactor) 
                   set “Too high temperature” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Water level control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Water level too high 
Trigger Water level sensor triggered  
Is water level sensor triggered? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Too high water level” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Pressure control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Pressure too high 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds 
Read inside pressure sensor P 
Is P>P-limit? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Too high pressure” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Water flow control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Water flow failure 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds 
Read flow meter FM 
Is FM>FM-max? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Water flow failure” alarm 
End use case  
1 
 
Task 2: Write test cases for the system (40-45 min) 
 
Your task is to write test cases for the steam boiler. You should use the test method named 
“Fault Injection”. 
 
Fault injection is a test method that is widely used in the area of testing safety critical 
software. As the name says, fault injection is testing based on injecting faults into the 
system to see how it reacts. There are several approaches using this method, the two most 
common is to manipulate the software or the hardware to simulate that a hazard is 
occurring. One way of doing this is to manipulate sensors with faulty values, to see if the 
system can recover by executing commands to the actuators (water pump, heating element 
etc.).  
 
You should only write test cases that uses fault injection techniques, and your goal is to 
write test cases that test all the faults in the steam boiler that you can think of. The test 
cases should achieve as high coverage of the system as possible, so be sure to read the 
documentation carefully to achieve a good understanding of all the aspects of the system. 
 
Fill your test cases into the tables that are handed out. More tables are available if needed. 
An example test case is provided below. The example is taken from a cruise control 
system for a car, where the speed sensor is manipulated so that it reads a too high value. 
 
 
Test case number 0 
Name Speed too high 
Pre-condition The speed sensor reads a too high value 
Pass criteria 
(how should the system react to this?) 
1. Decrease speed so that 
2. The current speed is below or equal 
to the set speed 
 
Textual description 
 
Testing is done by manipulating the speed 
sensor so that it reads a too high speed. The 
system should react by decreasing the speed 
so it is under or equal to the set speed. 
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Case 2
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CASE 2 
Introduction 
 
The system under test is a control system for a steam boiler. The following documentation 
is available: 
 
- The steam boiler with safety control units 
- Safety requirements 
- Textual use cases 
- Results from safety analysis (PHA) 
- The implemented safety barriers 
 
Task 1: Get an understanding of the system (15-20 min) 
 
Steam boiler with safety control units  
 
 
 
Steam boiler with control system and designated safety measures 
 
 
2 
 
The water pump, denoted by P, pumps water into the boiler. The heating element heats the 
water inside the tank, and steam is produced. There are several sensors which send signals to 
the control units.  
 
Sensor L: Gives a signal if the water is above this level 
Sensor P: Reads the pressure inside the tank 
Sensor T: Reads the temperature inside/outside the tank (you can name them T_inside and 
T_outside when writing test cases) 
 
There are two control units which read these sensors, and execute actions according to the 
values they receive. The control units control two actuators; the water pump and the heat 
element. Also, there are two valves, one which delivers process steam, and one that sends 
excess steam into the air. It is also possible to shut down power to the heating element. 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety requirements 
 
1. If water level greater than max water level then the safety system shall  stop feeding 
pump 
2. If steam pressure greater than max pressure level then the safety system shall  stop 
feeding pump 
3. If external temperature greater than max external temperature then the safety system 
shall cut power heating element 
4. If water flow greater than max water flow then the safety system shall stop feeding 
pump 
5. If steam pressure greater than critical pressure level then the steam boiler shall open 
safety valve  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Textual use cases 
 
Use Case Name Drum temperature control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Drum temperature is below limit or power to heater has been 
disconnected and alarm has been set 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds  
Read outside drum-temperature sensor T_outside 
Is T_outside>T_outside-limit? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Contactor) 
                   set “Too high temperature” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Water level control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Water level too high 
Trigger Water level sensor triggered  
Is water level sensor triggered? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Too high water level” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Pressure control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Pressure too high 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds 
Read inside pressure sensor P 
Is P>P-limit? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Too high pressure” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Water flow control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Water flow failure 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds 
Read flow meter FM 
Is FM>FM-max? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Water flow failure” alarm 
End use case  
 
 
2 
 
 
Results from PHA 
 
 
Hazard Cause Main effect Preventive action Realization   
Too high 
pressure in 
the tank 
  
  
Not able to turn off the 
heating (sensor, control, 
actuator, connections) 
  
Boiler explodes 
  
Safety valve 
Original 
requirement  
Turn off the heat 
Detect and 
control 
Feeding pump failure (too 
strong) 
Boiler rupture 
Turn off power to the 
feeding pump 
Detect and 
control 
Too high 
water level 
Water level regulation 
failure (sensor, control, 
actuator, connections) 
Water to the 
process 
Pump emergency stop 
Detect and 
control 
Too high 
pressure in 
the feed pipe 
  
Non-return valve failure 
  
Release boiling 
water to the 
water supply 
  
Two non-return valves 
in series 
- 
Emergency valve for 
releasing pressure 
Original 
requirements 
The tank is too 
hot 
  
Too little water and too 
much heat (sensor, 
control, actuator, 
connections) 
  
Tank gets hot/fire 
  
Turn off the heat 
Detect and 
stop 
Add water? - 
Unintentional 
leaks 
  
Corrosion 
People get 
scalded 
Inspection, collector 
tray or quality 
assurance 
- 
Bad welding/fittings 
People get 
scalded 
Inspection, collector 
tray or quality 
assurance 
- 
Electric shock Short circuit 
People get 
hurt/killed 
Fuses - 
Flooding Breakage in pipes 
Damage to 
equipment 
and/or 
environment 
Flow meter, collector 
tray 
- 
 
Results from preliminary safety analysis – PHA 
 
PHA(Preliminary hazard analysis) is a safety analysis method used to find and define 
possible hazards, together with their causes and effects. Preventive actions against 
the found hazards are also provided.  
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The implemented barriers  
 
The preventive actions are realized through two different barriers of safety measures: 
 
1. Detect and control. 
2. Detect and stop. 
 
The right column in the PHA results table shows which barrier is used to implement 
preventive actions. The barriers are explained below. 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows how the two barriers are implemented into the system. 
 
The first barrier makes use of three sensors, and the second uses one. The first barrier is 
used for detecting and controlling faults in the system. It should be able to put the system 
back into a normal state after detecting a problems/hazards. 
 
If the first barrier fails to work, the second barrier should cut the power by using the 
emergency shut-down unit. This is a last measure to prevent accidents, and after this 
barrier is used, an inspection and possible mending is needed before the system can be 
restarted again. 
 
The implementation of the two barriers is shown in the figure on the first page by circles 
around the components involved. 
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Task 2: Write test cases for the system (40-45 min) 
 
Your task is to write test cases for the steam boiler. Use the test method “Fault Injection”. 
 
Fault injection is a test method that is widely used in the area of testing safety critical 
software. As the name says, fault injection is based on injecting faults into the system to 
see how it reacts. There are several approaches using this method, the two most common 
is to manipulate the software or the hardware to simulate that a hazard is occurring. One 
way of doing this is to manipulate sensors with faulty values, to see if the system can 
recover by executing commands to the actuators (water pump, heating element etc.).  
 
You should only write test cases that uses fault injection techniques, and your goal is to 
write test cases that test all the faults in the steam boiler that you can think of. The test 
cases should achieve as high coverage of the system as possible, so be sure that you have 
read the documentation carefully, and achieved a good understanding of all the aspects of 
the system. 
 
Fill your test cases into the tables that are handed out. More tables are available if needed. 
An example test case is provided below. The example is taken from a cruise control 
system for a car, where the speed sensor is manipulated so that it reads a too high value. 
 
 
Test case number 0 
Name Speed to high 
Pre-condition The speed sensor reads a too high value 
Pass criteria 
(how should the system react to this?) 
1. Decrease speed so that 
2. The current speed is below or equal 
to the set speed 
 
Textual description 
 
Testing is done by manipulating the speed 
sensor so that it reads a too high speed. The 
system should react by decreasing the speed 
so it is under or equal to the set speed. 
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CASE 3 
Introduction 
 
The system under test is a control system for a steam boiler. The following documentation 
is available: 
 
- Steam boiler with safety control units 
- Safety requirements 
- Textual use cases 
Task 1: Get an understanding of the system (15-20 min) 
 
The steam boiler with safety control units  
 
 
 
 
 
The water pump, denoted by P, pumps water into the boiler. The heating element heats the 
water inside the tank, and steam is produced. There are several sensors which send signals 
to the control units.  
 
 
Sensor L: Gives a signal if the water is above this level 
Sensor P: Reads the pressure inside the tank 
Sensor T: Reads the temperature inside/outside the tank(you can name them T_outside 
and T_inside when writing test cases) 
3 
 
 
There are two control units which uses these sensors, and execute actions according to the 
values they receive. The control units control two actuators; the water pump and the heat 
element. Also, there are two valves, one which delivers process steam, and one that sends 
excess steam into the air. It is also possible to shut down power to the heating element. 
 
 
 
 
Safety requirements 
 
1. If water level greater than max water level then the safety system shall  stop feeding 
pump 
2. If steam pressure greater than max pressure level then the safety system shall  stop 
feeding pump 
3. If external temperature greater than max external temperature then the safety system 
shall cut power heating element 
4. If water flow greater than max water flow then the safety system shall stop feeding 
pump 
5. If steam pressure greater than critical pressure level then the steam boiler shall open 
safety valve  
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Textual use cases 
 
 
 
Use Case Name Drum temperature control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Drum temperature is below limit or power to heater has been 
disconnected and alarm has been set 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds  
Read outside drum-temperature sensor T_outside 
Is T_outside>T_outside-limit? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Contactor) 
                   set “Too high temperature” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Water level control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Water level too high 
Trigger Water level sensor triggered  
Is water level sensor triggered? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Too high water level” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Pressure control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Pressure too high 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds 
Read inside pressure sensor P 
Is P>P-limit? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Too high pressure” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Water flow control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Water flow failure 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds 
Read flow meter FM 
Is FM>FM-max? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Water flow failure” alarm 
End use case  
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Task 2: Write test cases for the system (40-45 min) 
 
Your task is to write test cases for the steam boiler. You should write the test cases with 
the use of the test method “Boundary Value Analysis/Equivalence partitioning”. 
 
The test method is based on the limits or values for a system. The most common 
approaches to this method is to check if a value is over/under a given value/limit, and 
define what the system should do if this occurs. The test case will check if the system acts 
correctly when a limit is crossed. One example for cruise control for a car: if 
current_speed>set_speed, the car should decrease speed, either by braking or letting go of 
the accelerator. 
 
You should only write test cases that use the technique described above. More 
specifically, check if values for sensors are higher/lower/equal than a given limit, and 
define how the system should react if behaving correctly. Your goal is to write test cases 
that test all the faults in the steam boiler that you can think of. The test cases should 
achieve as high coverage of the system as possible, so be sure to read the documentation 
carefully to achieve a good understanding of all the aspects of the system. 
 
Fill your test cases into the tables that are handed out. More tables are available if needed. 
An example test case is provided below. 
 
Test case number 0 
Name Speed to high 
Pre-condition current_speed>set_speed 
Pass criteria 
(how should the system react to this?) 
1. Decrease speed so that 
2. current_speed<=set_speed 
 
 
Textual description 
 
If the current speed is over the set speed, the 
system should decrease speed until the 
current speed is under the set speed 
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CASE 4 
Introduction 
 
The system under test is a control system for a steam boiler. The following documentation 
is available: 
 
- The steam boiler with safety control units 
- Safety requirements 
- Textual use cases 
- Results from safety analysis (PHA) 
- The implemented safety barriers 
Task 1: Get an understanding of the system (15-20 min) 
 
 
Steam boiler with safety control units  
 
 
 
Steam boiler with control system and designated safety measures 
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The water pump, denoted by P, pumps water into the boiler. The heating element heats the 
water inside the tank, and steam is produced. There are several sensors which send signals to 
the control units.  
 
Sensor L: Gives a signal if the water is above this level 
Sensor P: Reads the pressure inside the tank 
Sensor T: Reads the temperature inside/outside the tank(you can name them T_outside and 
T_inside when writing test cases) 
 
There are two control units which read these sensors, and execute actions according to the 
values they receive. The control units control two actuators; the water pump and the heat 
element. Also, there are two valves, one which delivers process steam, and one that sends 
excess steam into the air. It is also possible to shut down power to the heating element. 
 
 
 
 
Safety requirements 
 
1. If water level greater than max water level then the safety system shall  stop feeding 
pump 
2. If steam pressure greater than max pressure level then the safety system shall  stop 
feeding pump 
3. If external temperature greater than max external temperature then the safety system 
shall cut power heating element 
4. If water flow greater than max water flow then the safety system shall stop feeding 
pump 
5. If steam pressure greater than critical pressure level then the steam boiler shall open 
safety valve  
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Textual use cases 
 
Use Case Name Drum temperature control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Drum temperature is below limit or power to heater has been 
disconnected and alarm has been set 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds  
Read outside drum-temperature sensor T_outside 
Is T_outside>T_outside-limit? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Contactor) 
                   set “Too high temperature” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Water level control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Water level too high 
Trigger Water level sensor triggered  
Is water level sensor triggered? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Too high water level” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Pressure control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Pressure too high 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds 
Read inside pressure sensor P 
Is P>P-limit? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Too high pressure” alarm 
End use case  
 
Use Case Name Water flow control 
Actor Main control system 
Pre-condition Safety control system activated 
Post-condition Water flow failure 
Trigger Time triggered – run every 10 seconds 
Read flow meter FM 
Is FM>FM-max? 
      Yes => send power-off signal to actuator (Water pump) 
                   Set “Water flow failure” alarm 
End use case  
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Results from PHA 
 
 
Hazard Cause Main effect Preventive action Realization   
Too high 
pressure in 
the tank 
  
  
Not able to turn off the 
heating (sensor, control, 
actuator, connections) 
  
Boiler explodes 
  
Safety valve 
Original 
requirement  
Turn off the heat 
Detect and 
control 
Feeding pump failure (too 
strong) 
Boiler rupture 
Turn off power to the 
feeding pump 
Detect and 
control 
Too high 
water level 
Water level regulation 
failure (sensor, control, 
actuator, connections) 
Water to the 
process 
Pump emergency stop 
Detect and 
control 
Too high 
pressure in 
the feed pipe 
  
Non-return valve failure 
  
Release boiling 
water to the 
water supply 
  
Two non-return valves 
in series 
- 
Emergency valve for 
releasing pressure 
Original 
requirements 
The tank is too 
hot 
  
Too little water and too 
much heat (sensor, 
control, actuator, 
connections) 
  
Tank gets hot/fire 
  
Turn off the heat 
Detect and 
stop 
Add water? - 
Unintentional 
leaks 
  
Corrosion 
People get 
scalded 
Inspection, collector 
tray or quality 
assurance 
- 
Bad welding/fittings 
People get 
scalded 
Inspection, collector 
tray or quality 
assurance 
- 
Electric shock Short circuit 
People get 
hurt/killed 
Fuses - 
Flooding Breakage in pipes 
Damage to 
equipment 
and/or 
environment 
Flow meter, collector 
tray 
- 
 
Results from preliminary safety analysis – PHA 
 
PHA(Preliminary hazard analysis) is a safety analysis method used to find and define 
possible hazards, together with their causes and effects. Preventive actions against 
the found hazards are also provided.  
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The implemented barriers  
 
The preventive actions are realized through two different barriers of safety measures: 
 
1. Detect and control. 
2. Detect and stop. 
 
The right column in the PHA results table shows which barrier is used to implement 
preventive actions. The barriers will be explained below. 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows how the two barriers are implemented into the system. 
 
The first barrier makes use of three sensors, and the second uses one. The first barrier is 
used for detecting and controlling faults in the system. It should be able to put the system 
back into a normal state after detecting a problems/hazards. 
 
If the first barrier fails to work, the second barrier should cut the power by using the 
emergency shut-down unit. This is a last measure to prevent accidents, and after this 
barrier is used, an inspection and possible mending is needed before the system can be 
restarted again. 
 
The implementation of the two barriers is shown in the figure on the first page by circles 
around the components involved. 
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Task 2: Write test cases for the system (40-45 min) 
 
Your task is to write test cases for the steam boiler. You should write the test cases with 
the use of the test method “Boundary Value Analysis/Equivalence partitioning”. 
 
The test method is based on the limits or values for a system. The most common 
approaches to this method is to check if a value is over/under a given value/limit, and 
define what the system should do if this occurs. The test case will check if the system acts 
correctly when a limit is crossed. One example for cruise control for a car: if 
current_speed>set_speed, the car should decrease speed, either by braking or letting go of 
the accelerator. 
 
You should only write test cases that use the technique described above. More 
specifically, check if values for sensors are higher/lower/equal than a given limit, and 
define how the system should react if behaving correctly. Your goal is to write test cases 
that test all the faults in the steam boiler that you can think of. The test cases should 
achieve as high coverage of the system as possible, so be sure to read the documentation 
carefully, and achieved a good understanding of all the aspects of the system. 
 
Fill your test cases into the tables that are handed out. More tables are available if needed. 
An example test case is provided below. 
 
Test case number 0 
Name Speed to high 
Pre-condition current_speed>set_speed 
Pass criteria 
(how should the system react to this?) 
1. Decrease speed so that 
2. current_speed<=set_speed 
 
 
Textual description 
 
If the current speed is over the set speed, the 
system should decrease speed until the 
current speed is under the set speed 
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